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Aug 2, 2024
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three-ladder-translation
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美国社会分为三个阶梯：劳工阶梯（追求物质成功）、士绅阶梯（重视教育与文化影响）和权贵阶梯（追求权力与财富）。每个阶梯内部有不同的社会层次，流动性有限。士绅阶梯与权贵阶梯之间存在根本对立，士绅阶梯倾向于自由主义，而权贵阶梯则偏向权威主义。劳工阶梯面临失业和社会地位下降的风险，整体社会结构的变化可能导致未来的冲突。
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迈克尔·O·丘奇（Michael O. Church）将美国社会阶层分成了三个阶梯，分别是：劳工阶梯（从事体力劳动、追求物质成功）、士绅阶梯（重视教育，追求文化影响和创造性成就）和权贵阶梯（追求权力和极端财富）。每个阶梯都有自己的价值观和成功标准，阶梯内又从底层到顶层有细分。这个理论认为，阶梯之间的流动虽然有可能，但并不常见，且收入和财富在每个阶梯内部和阶梯之间都有很大差异。丘奇的模型试图超越单纯的经济因素，提供一个更加细致和复杂的美国社会阶层视角，他对美国各个社会阶层的分析对于我们理解中国的社会阶层也有参考和借鉴意义。本文是我将丘奇的原文进行的全文翻译，需要注意的是，原文写作的时间较早，大概在2013年初。十几年来，经过了经济危机、特朗普上任和新冠疫情，美国社会结构已经发生重大变化，文中各个阶梯的人口比例也可能不再具有参考价值。请读者知悉。
这张图用“三把梯子”来解释美国社会分层：劳工阶梯主要按“财富/收入”来排序，从时薪服务业到高技能蓝领再到小老板；士绅阶梯主要按“教育与文化资本、与现实的距离”来排序，从第一代大学生到专业人士、精英创意人，再到能塑造公共话语的文化领袖；权贵阶梯则按“权力与关系网络”来排序，从想挤进上层的投行新人/创业者，到高管（工作中的富人）、老钱，再到拥有跨国影响力的顶层权势者。图片想表达的是：社会地位并不只是单条“从穷到富”的直线，而是三套价值体系各自内部的爬升；梯子之间也有少量“对齐”的跳跃通道，但总体流动不多。
Typical depictions of social class in the United States posit a linear, ordered hierarchy. I’ve actually come to the conclusion that there are 3 distinct ladders, with approximately four social classes on each. Additionally, there is an underclass of people not connected to any of the ladders, creating an unlucky 13th social class. I’ll attempt to explain how this three-ladder system works, what it means, and also why it is a source of conflict. The ladders I will assign the names Labor, Gentry, and Elite. My specific percentage estimates of each category are not derived from anything other than estimation based on what I’ve seen, and my limited understanding of the macroeconomics of income in the United States, so don’t take them for more than an approximation. I’ll assess the social role of each of these classes in order, from bottom to top.
一般认为，美国的社会阶层有从低到高依次排列的一套阶级划分。在我看来，美国的社会结构实际上首先可以分为三个不同的阶梯，每个阶梯内部又可以分为四个社会阶层。此外，还有一个被完全排除在所有社会阶层之外的社会底层，构成第十三个悲惨的社会阶层。我会通过本文解释这个三阶梯是如何运作的，这套社会结构的意义，以及它为什么是冲突的根源。我将这些阶梯分别命名为“劳工阶梯”、“士绅阶梯”和“权贵阶梯”。根据个人观察、对美国宏观经济和收入分布的有限理解，我得出了各阶层人数的占比，因此这些数据仅供参考，不应被视为精确值。我将从底层到顶层依次分析每个阶层的社会角色。
This is, one should note, an exposition of social class rather than income. Therefore, in many cases, precise income criteria cannot be defined, because there’s so much more involved. Class is more sociological in nature than wealth or income, and much harder to change. People can improve their incomes dramatically, but it’s rare for a person to move more than one or two rungs in a lifetime. Social class determines how a person is perceived, that person’s access to information, and what opportunities will be available to a person.
需要指出的是，本文分析的焦点是社会阶层而非收入。因此，在多数情况下，很难给出准确的收入标准，因为涉及的因素过于复杂。阶级更加注重社会学特性，而不是财富多寡和收入高低，而且阶层也更难改变。在一生中，人的收入可以显著增加，但能够实现社会阶层跃升的人却寥寥无几。社会阶层决定了这个人在社会中的地位，决定了这个人获取信息的渠道，也决定了这个人可以获得哪些机会。
The underclass are not just poor, because there are poor people on the Labor ladder and a few (usually transiently or voluntarily) on the Gentry ladder who are poor. In fact, most poor Americans are not members of the Underclass. People in the Underclass are generationally poor. Some have never held jobs. Some are third-generation jobless, even. Each of these ladders (Labor, Gentry, and Elite) can be seen as an infrastructure based, in part, on social connections. There are some people who are not connected to any of these infrastructures, and they are the underclass.
社会底层并不是指穷人，因为在劳工阶层中也有穷人，在士绅阶层中也有少数穷人（通常是暂时穷困或自愿选择穷苦的生活）。事实上，大多数的美国贫困人口并不属于社会底层。社会底层的人都是世代贫穷的人。有些人从未工作过。有些人甚至是家中三代无业。不论是劳工、士绅还是精英阶梯，从一定程度上都可以看作是参与社会活动的基本单位。但社会底层却与社会完全脱节，不参与任何社会活动。
This represents “blue-collar” work and is often associated with “working class”, but some people in this distinction earn solidly “middle-class” incomes over $100,000 per year. What defines the Labor ladder is that the work is seen as a commodity, and that there’s rarely a focus on long-term career management. People are assessed based on how hard they work because, in this world, the way to become richer is to work more (not necessarily more efficiently or “smarter”). The Labor ladder is organized almost completely based on income; the more you make (age-adjusted) the higher your position is, and the more likely it is that your work is respected.
所谓劳工阶梯，就是“蓝领”工作，通常让人联想到“工人阶级”，但在这个阶梯中，有些人的年收入可以超过10万美元，实际上属于“中产阶级”。劳工阶梯的特点在于，他们出卖劳动力，他们的劳动力相当于商品，而这一阶梯很少有人关注长期的职业规划。劳工阶梯内评判一个人的标准是他工作的卖力程度，因为在这个阶梯内，赚更多钱的方法就是多干活（未必需要效率更高或更“聪明”）。劳工阶梯几乎完全是根据收入高低来划分阶层的；你挣得越多（按年龄调整），你的阶层就越高，你的工作就越有可能受到尊重。
Secondary Labor is what we call the “working poor”. These are people who earn 1 to 3 times the minimum wage and often have no health benefits. Many work two “part time” jobs at 35 hours per week (so their firms don’t have to provide benefits) with irregular hours. They have few skills and no leverage, so they tend to end up in the worst jobs, and those jobs enervate them so much that it becomes impossible for them to get the skills that would help them advance. The reason for the name Secondary in this class is that they are trapped in the “secondary” labor market: jobs originally intended for teenagers and well-off retirees that were never intended to pay a living wage. Wages for this category are usually quoted hourly and between $5 and $15 per hour.
低端劳工就是我们所说的“穷打工的”。他们的收入是最低工资的1到3倍，但通常没有医保福利。许多人要打两份“兼职”工作，每周工作35小时（因为这样公司就不必提供职工福利），工作时间也不固定。他们缺乏一技之长和资源，因此通常只能从事最底层的工作，而这些工作使他们疲于奔命，无法获得提升自身技能的机会。这个阶层之所以被称为“低端”劳工，是因为他们被困在了“低端”劳动力市场：这些工作本来针对的是青少年和不缺钱的退休人员，所以工资报酬根本就不足以维持生活。这一阶层通常都是挣时薪，每小时在5美元至15美元之间。
Primary Labor is what we tend to associate with “blue-collar” America. If by “average” we mean median, this is the average social class of Americans, although most people would call it working class, not middle. It usually means having enough money to afford an occasional vacation and a couple restaurant meals per month. People in the L3 class aren’t worried about having food to eat, but they aren’t very comfortable either, and an ill-timed layoff can be catastrophic. If the market for their skills collapses, they can end up falling down a rung into L4. When you’re in the Labor category, market forces can propel you up or down, and the market value of “commodity” labor has been going down for a long time. Typical L3 compensation is $20,000 to $60,000 per year.
中端劳工就是我们所说的美国“蓝领工人”。如果我们说“平均”的时候是指中位数，那么这个阶层就是美国人的平均社会阶层，不过大多数人会称之为工人阶级，而不是中产阶级。在这个阶层，表示你有足够的钱偶尔去度假，每个月能下个几次馆子。中端劳工阶层（L3）虽然不愁吃饭，但生活也并不富裕。突如其来的裁员就可能会带来毁灭性的打击。如果市场不再需要他们的劳动技能，他们就会滑落到低端劳工阶层（L4）。如果你属于“劳工阶梯”，你的社会阶层就会因为市场供需而起起落落，而市场上“商品化”劳动力的价值已经持续贬值很久了。典型的中端劳工阶层（L3）薪酬为每年两万美元至六万美元。
In the supposed “golden age” of the United States (the 1950s) a lot of people were earning L2 compensation for L3 work. In a time when well-paid but monotonous labor was not considered such a bad thing (to people coming off the Great Depression and World War II, stable but boring jobs were a godsend) this was seen as desirable, but we can’t go back to that, and most people wouldn’t want to. Most Millennials would be bored shitless by the jobs available in that era that our society occasionally mourns losing.
在所谓的美国“黄金时代”（20世纪50年代），许多从事L3级别工作的人都能获得L2级别的报酬。当时，就算工作内容单调，但只要工资给的够多，大家就不觉得有什么不好（对于经历了大萧条和二战的人来说，枯燥但稳定的工作是一种恩赐），中端劳工阶层当时是很吸引人的。然而，我们已经回不到过去，而且大多数人也不愿意回到那时候了。对大多数千禧一代（八零九零后）来说，那时候的工作太单调乏味了，可是如今这些工作消失了，我们偶尔又会觉得惋惜。
High-skill Labor entails having enough income and job security to be legitimately “middle class”. People in this range can attend college courses, travel internationally (but not very often) and send their children to good schools. Plumbers, airline pilots, and electricians are in this category, and some of these people make over $100,000 per year. For them, there must be some barrier to entry into their line of work, or some force keeping pay high (such as unionization). Within the culture of the Labor ladder, these people are regarded highly.
高端劳工有足够的收入和工作保障，够得上“中产阶级”一员。这个阶层的人可以上大学，偶尔出国旅行（但没法经常出国），能送子女读重点学校。美国的水电工和飞行员都属于这一阶层，有些人的年收入能超过10万美元。对他们来说，进入他们的职业领域有技术门槛，或者需要组织力量（如工会）维持较高的薪酬水平。在劳工阶梯的文化中，高端劳工备受尊敬。
Labor Leadership is the top of the Labor ladder, and it’s what blue-collar America tends to associate with success. (The reason they fail to hate “the 1%” is that they think of L1 small business owners, rather than blue-blooded parasites, as “rich people”.) These are people who, often through years of very hard work and by displaying leadership capability, have ascended to an upper-middle-class income. They aren’t usually “managers” (store managers are L2) but small business owners and landlords, while they’re often seen doing the grunt work of their businesses (such as by running the register when all the cashiers call in sick). They can generate passive income from endeavors like restaurant franchises and earn a solidly upper-middle income standing, but culturally they are still part of Labor. This suits them well, because where they excel is at leading people who are in the Labor category.
劳工领袖位于劳工阶梯的顶端，美国蓝领阶层通常认为到达这一阶层的都是成功人士。（他们之所以不憎恨这“1%”，是因为L1阶层的小企业主在他们看来只是“有钱人”，而不是蓝血贵族寄生虫。）这些人通常通过多年的辛勤工作，展现出色的领导能力，收入增加而跻身中上阶层。他们通常不是“经理”（店长属于L2阶层），而是小企业主或业主，他们依然要承担企业的繁重工作（例如，如果所有收银员都请病假了，他们也要亲自负责收银）。他们也许通过连锁餐饮等业务打造被动收入，并获得稳固的中上收入和地位，但在文化上，他们仍然属于“劳工阶层”。这对他们来说恰如其分，因为他们最擅长的正是领导属于“劳工阶层”的人。
England had a landed gentry for a while. We have an educated one. Labor defines status based on the market value of one’s commodity work. The Gentry rebels against commoditization with a focus on qualities that might be, from an extensional perspective, irrelevant. They dislike conflict diamonds, like fair-trade coffee, and drive cultural trends. In the 1950s, they were all about suburbia. In 2012, they had the same enthusiasm for returning to the cities. They value themselves not based on their incomes but, much more so, on access to respected institutions: elite universities, leading technology companies, museums and artistic endeavors. Labor aspires to occupational success and organizational leadership, while the Gentry aspires to education and cultural leadership.
历史上，英国曾经历过“乡绅”时期，他们拥有土地，或者拥有乡村庄园，可以完全依靠租金收入生活，是绅士阶层的一部分。而在美国，士绅则主要是那些受过高等教育的阶层。商品化的劳动力在市场中的价值决定了劳工阶层的社会地位。士绅阶层则反对劳动力的商品化，而更加关注那些外在看可能无关紧要的品质。他们不推崇内战和冲突中采掘的“血钻”，推崇照顾种植户福利的公平贸易咖啡，并在社会中引领文化潮流。在20世纪50年代，他们蜂拥迁往郊区居住。2012年，他们又以同样的热情重返城市居住。他们看重的不是收入高低，而是能否进入受人尊敬的机构：名牌大学、顶尖科技公司、博物馆和艺术机构。劳工阶梯渴望职业成功和在组织内的领导地位，而士绅阶梯则追求教育和文化上的领导权。
Before going further, it’s worth noting that the typical socioeconomic ordering would have each Gentry level two levels above the corresponding Labor level in social standing. Thus, G1 > G2 > (G3 ~= L1) > (G4 ~= L2) > L3 > L4.
在进一步说明之前，需要注意的是，在社会经济阶层排序中，士绅阶层的社会地位通常比对应的劳工阶层高两级。也就是说，G1 > G2 > (G3 ≈ L1) > (G4 ≈ L2) > L3 > L4。
Transitional Gentry is the lowest rung of the Gentry ladder. Typically, I think of community colleges when trying to explain G4. It’s the class of people who are coming into the Gentry, usually from L2, and most people in it are looking to attain G3 (and many do). Since the Gentry is defined by education, culture, and cultural influence, earning a four-year degree (which about 20% of American adults have) will usually put a person solidly into G3.
新晋士绅是士绅阶梯中最低的一级。G4这一阶层，通常会让我联想到社区大学（美国的社区大学提供两年制的高等教育课程，通常以较低的学费为学生提供职业培训和通向四年制大学的转学机会）。这一阶层是进入士绅阶梯的门槛，很多人通常从L2阶层跨越进入G4阶层，其中多数人都希望进一步跨越到G3阶层（也有很多人实现了这一目标）。士绅阶层的地位是由教育、文化和文化影响力界定的，因此获得四年制本科学位（约20%的美国成年人拥有本科学位）的人通常就可以确定进入了G3阶层。
Mobility between G4 and L2 is common, and G4 is a “young people” class, because people who don’t keep abreast of politics, current events, and at least the ”upper-middle-brow” culture of shows like Mad Men [0] tend to return to L2 (which is not an inferior class, but an approximately-equal one with different values). Those who keep up tend to progress to G3.
G4阶层和L2阶层之间的流动很常见。G4阶层是一个“年轻人”的阶层，因为不紧跟政治、时事的人，不了解像《广告狂人》[0]等美剧里“中上流”文化的人，往往会滑入L2阶层（不是说L2阶层就比G4阶层低一等，这两个阶层其实近似一样高，只是价值观不同）。G4阶层内能够跟上时代潮流的人通常会跃升到G3阶层。
[0] A couple of people have emailed me to ask why I “knocked” Mad Men. That wasn’t my intention. It’s an excellent show. “Upper-middle-brow” is not panning. I’m lower-middle-brow on a good day.
[0]有人问我为什么点名批评《广告狂人》。这并非我的本意。《广告狂人》是非常精彩的美剧。“中上流”文化也不是贬义词。我自己顶多算是“中下流”阶层。
Primary Gentry is what Americans think of as the cultural “upper-middle class”. They have four-year college degrees and typically have professional jobs of middling autonomy and above-average income, but usually not leadership positions. Incomes in this class vary widely (in part, because the Gentry is not defined by income) but generally fall between $30,000 and $200,000 per year. People in this class tend to be viewed as taste-setters by Labor but are viewed as gauche by the higher-ranking G1 and G2 classes.
主流士绅就是美国人心目中的“中上流”知识分子。他们一般都有四年制大学（本科）学位，通常从事中层专业岗位，收入高于平均水平，但通常不担任领导职位。这一阶层内的收入差距很大（部分原因是士绅阶层并不以收入高低为界定标准），但普遍收入在每年3万至20万美元之间。在劳工阶层眼中，G3阶层是生活品味的引导者，但在更高的G1阶层和G2阶层眼中，G3阶层却俗不可耐。
High Gentry tend to come from elite colleges and traditionally gravitated toward “junior executive” roles in medium-sized companies, innovative start-ups, management consultancies, and possibly investment banking (which facilitates the G2-E4 transition). But G2′s wouldn’t be caught dead in jobs that seem perfectly fine to G3′s, which they view (often rightly) to be dead ends. Having interesting, respected work is important to G2′s. To a G2, being a college professor, scientist, entrepreneur, or writer are desirable jobs. Creative control of work is important to G2′s, although not all are able to get it (because creative jobs are so rare). David Brooks’ Bobos in Paradise captured well the culture of G2′s in that time. Members of this social class aggressively manage their careers to get the most out (in terms of intellectual and financial reward) of their careers, but what they really want is enough success and money to do what they really value, which is to influence culture.
上流士绅通常毕业于名校，通常在中型企业、创新型初创企业、管理咨询公司担任 “高层主管”，也可能在投资银行担任“高层主管”（这让他们有机会从G2阶层跃升到E4阶层）。但是，那些在G3阶层的人看来非常好的工作，G2阶层的人是不会去做的，因为他们认为这些工作没有前途（一般也的确如此）。对于G2阶层来说，拥有精彩且受人尊敬的工作至关重要。对于G2阶层来说，大学教授、科学家、企业家或作家都是令人向往的职业。对他们来说，在工作中，能自主创新非常重要，尽管不是所有人都能从事这样的工作（因为能创新的工作非常稀缺）。大卫·布鲁克斯（David Brooks）的《BOBO族：新社会精英的崛起》（Bobos in Paradise）一书精准地描述了当时G2阶层的文化。这个社会阶层的成员积极管理自己的职业生涯，追求知识和经济的最大回报，但他们最想要的还是能够在名利双收后，去做他们最看重的事情，去影响文化。
G2 is my native social class, and probably that of most of my readers.
G2阶层就是我所在的社会阶层，可能也是我读者主要的社会阶层。
Cultural Influencers are the pinnacle of the Gentry. Jon Stewart is a classic example. He probably makes a “merely” upper-middle-class income working for the notoriously cheap Comedy Central, but he has the most well-regarded members of the intelligentsia on his show every night. For G1, I’m not talking about “celebrities”. Celebrities are a bizarre and tiny category that mixes all three ladders (I’d argue that they’re the upper tier of L1; most lack the power of Elites and the refinement of the Gentry). Rather, I’m talking about people who are widely recognized as smart, knowledgeable, creative, and above all, interesting. They tend also to have access to other interesting people. G1′s are not “famous” in the celebrity sense, and most of them aren’t that rich. I’d guess that their incomes vary mostly from $100,000 to $1 million per year, which is low for a social class that is so difficult to enter (much harder than E4, and possibly E3, to get into).
文化弄潮儿是士绅阶梯的峰顶。一个典型的例子就是“囧司徒”（乔恩·斯图尔特，Jon Stewart）。哪怕他只是在因低俗而臭名昭著的喜剧中心工作，收入可能也只是“中上流”水平，但他每晚的节目都吸引了最知名的知识分子参与。这里的G1阶层说的并不是“名人明星”。名人明星是一个人丁稀少却又稀奇古怪的群体，这个群体里包含全部三个阶梯（我觉得他们属于L1阶层的上层；大多数人缺乏成为权贵的权力和成为士绅的教养）。相反，这里的G1阶层指的是公认很聪明、博学、创新，而且有才华的人。他们往往还混迹于其他有才华的人之间。G1阶层的“闻名”并不是名人明星的那种“闻名”，而且大多数G1阶层的人也没那么富有。我猜他们的年收入大多在10万到100万美元之间。对于一个如此难以进入的社会阶层（比E4更难进入，也可能比E3更难进入）来说，这个收入其实已经很低了。
It’s quite likely that G1 is expanding, and it was probably much smaller in the past. The internet is allowing more people to become well-known and have some degree of cultural influence. Many bloggers have entered G1 without relying on established institutions such as publishers or universities (which used to be the only way). That said, G1 requires reliability in attention; people having their 15 minutes don’t count.
G1阶层很有可能正在扩大，而它过去的规模可能比现在还要小得多。互联网使更多的人成为知名人士，并拥有一定程度的文化影响力。许多进入G1阶层的博主已经不再需要依赖出版商或大学等传统机构（原来这是进入G1阶层的唯一途径）。尽管如此，G1阶层仍然需要长久稳定的关注度；偶然火个15分钟的那种不算。
This is an infrastructure “at the top of society”, but many of the people it includes are in many ways nowhere near the top. People complain about “the 1 percent”, but the reality is that most of that top 1.0% are nowhere near controlling positions within society.
这是一个“处于社会顶端”的阶梯，但这一阶梯里许多人在许多方面离金字塔尖还远得很。虽然“最富裕的1%”在美国引起社会大众的强烈反弹，但事实上，在这1%的顶端人群中，大多数人根本不在统治地位。
Not all of the Elite are in the top 1% for income, but most will have the opportunity to be. The Elite includes everyone from billionaires to out-of-college investment banking analysts (who earn a middle-class income in one of the most expensive cities on the planet). What they have in common is that they are exerting themselves toward ownership. Labor provides the work and values effort and loyalty. The Gentry provides culture and it values education and creativity. The Elite owns things and values control and establishment.
权贵阶梯的这1%并不都是因为收入和财富登峰造极而跻身这一阶梯的，但大多数人都有机会成为巨富。权贵阶梯里上到亿万富翁，下到大学刚毕业的投资银行分析师（只能在全球生活成本最昂贵的城市里赚中产阶级的收入）。他们的共同点在于，都在为掌握权力而努力拼搏。劳工阶梯提供劳动力，他们看重努力和忠诚。士绅阶梯提供文化力，他们重视教育和创新。权贵阶梯则掌握生产要素，他们看重控制权和体制。
As with the Gentry and Labor, when comparing these ladders, one should consider an Elite rung to be two levels above the corresponding Gentry rung, so in terms of social standing, E1 > E2 > (E3 ~= G1) > (E4 ~= G2) > G3 > G4.
与士绅阶梯和劳工阶梯类似，在比较不同阶梯的阶层时，权贵阶层比相应士绅阶层高两级。因此，就社会地位而言，E1 > E2 > (E3 ≈ G1) > (E4 ≈ G2) > G3 > G4。
The Strivers are another transitional class that is generally for young people only. They aren’t actually Elite, but they might, if lucky, move into E3. Junior investment bankers, law firm associates, and young start-up entrepreneurs are in this category. They’re trying to “break in” to something rich and successful. If they get in, they’ll become solid E3. If they fail in doing so, they usually return to G2: upper-middle-class professionals not strongly bound to the Elite infrastructure. G2 is usually a happier place than E4, but E3′s and E4′s tend to deride this transition. In start-ups, a business move favoring this step (toward G1-2 upper-middle-class stability) is derided as a “lifestyle business”.
上位者阶层也是一个过渡阶层，通常只有年轻人。他们实际上并非真正的权贵，但如果运气好的话，他们可能跃升到E3阶层。初级投资银行家、律师事务所的律师以及年轻的创业者都属于这一阶层。他们正在努力“闯入”富豪和成功人士的圈子。如果他们能成功完成跃升，就可以真真正正地成为E3阶层的一份子。如果无法完成跃升，他们通常会跌落到G2阶层，也就是中上流的职业精英，还不足以与权贵阶梯形成紧密联系。G2阶层通常比E4阶层更快乐更惬意，但E3阶层和E4阶层往往会鄙视这种阶层滑坡。在初创企业中，面向这些阶层滑坡（至G1阶层和G2阶层享受中上流稳定生活）的商业模式常被讥讽为“生活方式市场”。
Elite Servants are the law-firm partners and senior investment bankers and corporate executives that might be called the “working rich” and they comprise what was once called the “white-shoe” culture. They’re quite well-off, as far as servants go, often earning incomes from $200,000 to $5 million per year, but their social standing is conditional. They serve the rich, and the rich have to keep finding them useful for them to maintain their place. It’s not an enviable place to be, because the social expectations associated with maintaining E3 status require high spending, and even the extremely well-compensated ($1 million per year and up) E3′s rarely have the savings to survive more than a year or two without a job, because of the need to maintain connections. E3′s tend to have as many money problems as people in the lower social classes. E3′s also suffer because they live in a “small world” society driven by reputation, long-standing grudges and often petty contempt. E3′s still get fired– a lot, because the pretense that justifies E3-level status (of a large-company “executive”) requires leadership and many don’t have it– and when it happens to them, they can face years during which they can’t find appropriate employment.
白手套阶层包括律师事务所合伙人、高级投资银行家和企业高管，是被称为“打工皇帝”的阶层，曾经“白鞋”文化的那批人。虽然也是打工的，但他们非常富裕，年收入通常在20万美元到500万美元之间，但他们的社会地位是有条件的。他们为真正的权贵阶梯服务，而他们必须对权贵阶梯有用，才能维持自己的社会地位。这并不是一个值得羡慕的阶层，因为在E3阶层，你得维持与E3阶层地位相当的高消费，才能满足社会期望。即使是收入极高（年薪100万美元以上）的E3阶层，由于需要维持人脉关系，也很少有足够的积蓄在没有工作收入的情况下生存超过一两年。跟阶层更低的人一样，E3阶层仍然面临许多经济困境。而且，E3阶层生活在"小圈子"社会中，有传承已久的家族声望、世代积怨和鸡毛蒜皮的磕磕绊绊，因此生活并不惬意。E3阶层也会被解雇，而且还不少见，因为E3阶层（大公司“高管”）的身份需要有领导力，并不是每一个人都具备。一旦他们被解雇，就会面临多年找不到合适工作的困境。
People tend to think of face leaders (politicians and CEOs) as belonging to a higher social class, but most are E3. If they were higher, they wouldn’t have to work so hard to be rich. Examining our most recent presidents, Barack Obama is G1, the George Bushes were E2, Bill Clinton was E3, and Reagan was in the celebrity category that is a hybrid of E3 and L1. John Kennedy was E2, while Lyndon Johnson was L1. Most CEOs, however, are strictly E3, because CEOs are “rubber gloves” that are used for dirty work and thrown aside if they get too filthy. There’s too much reputation risk involved in being a corporate CEO for an E2 to want the job under most circumstances.
大家普遍认为活跃于表面的领导者（如政治家和首席执行官）就是上流的权贵阶层，但其实他们顶多算是E3阶层。如果他们是更高的权贵阶层，就不用如此辛苦费力地追求财富。看看最近几任美国总统，奥巴马其实是G1阶层，乔治·布什夫妇属于E2阶层，比尔·克林顿属于E3阶层，而里根则是E3阶层和L1阶层的混合体。约翰·肯尼迪属于E2阶层，林登·约翰逊属于L1阶层。然而，严格来说，大多数首席执行官都是E3阶层，因为首席执行官就像“手套”，用来帮真正的权贵干脏活累活，等他们自己搞得太脏了，就会被用之即弃。在大多数情况下，担任公司首席执行官会带来很多声誉风险，因此E2阶层并不愿意干这份工作。
National Elite are what most Americans think of as “upper class” or “old money”. They have Roman Numerals in their names, live in the Hamptons (although they’ve probably stopped using “summer” as a verb now that “the poors” know about it) and their families have attended Ivy League colleges for generations. They’re socially very well connected and have the choice not to work, or the choice to work in a wide array of well-compensated and highly-regarded jobs. Rarely do they work full time under traditional employment terms– never as subordinates, sometimes as executives in an apprentice role, often in board positions or “advisory” roles. It’s uncommon that an E2 will put a full-time effort into anything, because their objective with work is to associate their names with successful institutions, but not to get too involved.
（美国）国内权贵就是大多数美国人心目中的“上层阶级”或“老钱”。他们的名字里带着（一世、二世）数字，住在汉普顿（“避暑”这个词已经被“穷人”学会了，所以他们就不再用了），他们的家族世代都在常春藤大学里就读。他们有很深厚的社会资源，可以选择不工作，也可以选择从事报酬丰厚、社会地位高的工作。他们很少从事传统的全职工作，就算工作也从来都不是下属，有时以学徒身份担任管理人员，更多的是担任董事会成员或“顾问”。E2阶层的人很少会全身心地投入到什么工作中，因为他们工作的目的是用成功机构的名气给自己背书，而不是深入参与业务。
To maintain E2 status, being wealthy is required. It takes about $500,000 per year, after tax, in income at a minimum. However, it’s not hard for a person with E2 status and connections to acquire this, even if the family money is lost. The jobs that E3′s regard as the pinnacle of professional achievement (the idea that such a notion as “professional achievement” exists is laughable to them; paid full-time work is dishonorable from an E2 perspective) are their safety careers.
要保持E2阶层的身份，富有是基本条件。每年的税后收入至少需要约50万美元。然而，对于一个拥有E2阶层地位和社会关系的人来说，高收入不是什么难事，即使家道中落、经济状况不佳，赚钱也不会是难事。在E3阶层眼里的职业成就巅峰，在E2阶层看来，不过是保底的工作（对他们来说，“职业成就”这种概念是很可笑的，连全职带薪工作都是不光彩的）。
Global Elite are a global social class, and extremely powerful in a trans-national way. These are the very rich, powerful, and deeply uncultured barbarians from all over the world who start wars in the Middle East for sport, make asses of themselves in American casinos, rape ski bunnies at Davos, and run the world. Like the Persian army in 300, they come from all over the place; they’re the ugliest and most broken of each nation. They’re the corporate billionaires and drug kingpins and third-world despots and real estate magnates. They’re not into the genteel, reserved “WASP culture” of E2′s, the corporate earnestness and “white shoe” professionalism of E3′s, or the hypertrophic intellectualism and creativity of G1′s and G2′s. They are all about control, and on a global scale. To channel Heisenberg, they’re in the empire business. They aren’t mere management or even “executives”. They’re owners. They don’t care what they own, or what direction the world takes, as long as they’re on top. They almost never take official executive positions within large companies, but they make a lot of the decisions behind the scenes.
世界权贵是一个跨越国界的社会阶层，在全球范围内都有极大的影响力。这些来自世界各地的野蛮人非常富有、掌握权力、缺乏文化素养。他们为了一时兴起在中东发动战争，在美国的赌场里为所欲为，在达沃斯的滑雪胜地与妙龄滑雪女郎（Ski Bunnies）肆意妄为，并且他们掌控着世界。就像电影《斯巴达300勇士》中的波斯军队一样，他们来自四面八方；他们是各个民族中最丑陋、最残暴的人。他们是亿万富翁、毒枭、发展中国家的独裁者和房地产巨头。他们不喜欢E2阶层优雅、矜持的“WASP文化”，不喜欢E3阶层认真的工作作风和“白鞋”文化的职业精神，也不喜欢G1阶层和G2阶层的过度知识主义和创新。他们只关注权力，对全世界的控制力。用海森堡的话说，他们从事的是帝国生意。他们不仅仅是管理层，甚至不能简单地称为“高管”。他们是霸主。他们不关心自己拥有多少财富，也不关心世界的变化，只要他们能保持在权力的顶端就满足了。他们几乎从不在大公司中担任正式的行政职务，但他们却在幕后说了算。
Unlike the National Elite, who tend toward a cultural conservatism and a desire to preserve certain traits that they consider necessary to national integrity, the Global Elite doesn’t give a shit about any particular country.
国内权贵一般是文化保守主义，希望祖国保留一些本国特有的必备的特征，而世界权贵不这么想，他们根本没有自己在乎的国家。
They’re fully multinational and view all the world’s political nations as entities to be exploited (like everything else). They foster corruption and crime if it serves their interests, and those interests are often ugly. Like Kefka from Final Fantasy VI, their reason for living is to create monuments to nonexistence.
他们是彻头彻尾的国际化阶层，世界上民族国家对他们来说都是可供利用的工具（如同其他资源一样）。只要符合他们的利益，他们就会助长腐败和犯罪，而他们的一些利益往往都很卑劣。就像《最终幻想6》中的凯夫卡一样，他们活着的理由就是为虚无建立纪念碑。
For the other social classes, there’s no uniform moral assumption that can apply. G1′s are likable and often deserving cultural leaders, but sometimes foolish, overrated, incompetent, infuriatingly petty, and too prone to groupthink to deserve their disproportionate clout. G2′s tend to have the best (or at least most robust) taste, because they don’t fall into G1 self-referentiality, but can be just as snooty and cliquish. As “pro-Gentry” as I may seem, it’s a massive simplification to treat that set as entirely virtuous. Likewise, the lower elite ranks (E2, E3, and E4) also have their mix of good and bad people. There are E2′s who want to live well and decently, E3′s trying to provide for their families, and E4′s trying to get in because they were brought up to climb the ladder. On the other hand, E1 is pretty much objectively evil, without exceptions. There are decent people who are billionaires, so there’s no income or wealth level at which 100% objective evil becomes the norm. But if you climb the social ladder, you get to a level at which it’s all cancer, all the way up. That’s E1. Why is it this way? Because the top end of the world’s elite is a social elite, not an economic one, and you don’t get deep into an elevated social elite unless you are very similar to the center of that cluster, and for the past 10,000 years the center of humanity’s top-of-the-top cluster has always been deep, featureless evil: people who burn peasants’ faces off because it amuses them. Whether you’re talking about a real person like Hitler, Stalin, Erik Prince, Osama bin Laden, or Kissinger, or a fictional example like The Joker, Kefka, Walter White, or Randall Flagg; when you get to the top of society, it’s always the same guy. Call it The Devil, but what’s scary is that it needs (and has) no supernatural powers; it’s human, and while one its representatives might get knocked off, another one will step up.
对于其他社会阶层来说，没有统一的道德标准。G1阶层是名副其实的文化领袖，但有时也显得愚蠢、名不副实、软弱无能、小气吝啬，而且太容易陷入群体思维，不配拥有他们具有的过大影响力。G2阶层拥有最好的（至少是最靠谱的）品味，因为他们不会陷入G1阶层那样的自我反省，但也可能同样势利和小气。尽管看起来我很“偏袒士绅阶梯”，但如果说士绅阶梯全都是好的，就过于绝对了。同样，较低层次的权贵阶层（E2阶层、E3阶层和E4阶层）中也有好人和坏人。有些E2阶层希望过上体面的生活，有些E3阶层也很努力养家糊口，还有些E4阶层希望融入上流社会，因为他们从小接受的教育就是要争上游。但是，E1阶层在客观上几乎是完全邪恶的，没有例外。亿万富翁中当然有正直的人，因此并不是说过了哪个收入或财富水平之后，100%都是邪恶的人。但是，如果在社会阶梯上不断攀升，到达一个阶层之后，那个阶层以上全员都是恶人。这就是E1阶层。为什么会这样呢？因为处于世界顶端的权贵阶层主要看社会关系，而收入高低。要想进入这个高高在上的顶流圈子，你得跟这个圈子的核心非常相似。而在过去的千万年里，人类顶流圈子的核心充斥深不可测的邪恶：比如为了娱乐而烧灼农民面孔的人。无论是希特勒、斯大林、埃里克·普林斯、奥萨马·本·拉登或基辛格这样的真实人物，还是小丑、凯夫卡、沃尔特·怀特或兰德尔·弗拉格这样的虚构角色；登上社会顶峰的永远是同一种人。他们是“魔鬼”，但可怕的是他们并不需要（也没有）超自然的力量；他们是人类，但就算消灭了这一个，另一个还会再出现。
What does all this mean? How do these ladders interrelate? Do these three separate social class structures often find themselves at odds and fight? Can people be part of more than one?
美国的社会三阶梯意味着什么？这些阶梯是如何相互作用的？这三个不同的社会阶层结构是否经常发生冲突和斗争？一个人可以同时处在不同的阶层吗？
What I’ve called the Labor, Gentry, and Elite “ladders” can more easily be described as “infrastructures”. For Labor, this infrastructure is largely physical and the relevant connection is knowing how to use that physical device or space, and getting people to trust a person to competently use (without owning, because that’s out of the question for most) these resources. For the Gentry, it’s an “invisible graph” of knowledge and education and “interestingness”, comprised largely of ideas. For the Elite, it’s a tight, exclusive network centered on social connections, power, and dominance. People can be connected to more than one of these infrastructures, but people usually bind more tightly to the one of higher status, except when at the transitional ranks (G4 and E4) which tend to punt people who don’t ascend after some time. The overwhelmingly high likelihood is that a person is aligned most strongly to one and only one of these structures. The values are too conflicting for a person not to pick one horse or the other.
本文的劳工阶梯、士绅阶梯和权贵阶梯的都是参与社会活动的“基本结构”。劳工阶梯主要从事的是体力劳动，在社会活动中贡献自己操作设备的技术和经验，让社会相信他们能够可靠地使用这些设备（但他们不拥有生产资料，因为对大多数劳工阶层来说几乎不可能）。士绅阶梯在社会活动中主要贡献一张由知识、教育和“趣味性”构成的“看不见的图纸”，其核心要素主要是思想。对于权贵阶梯来说，他们主要占据了以社交关系、权力和地位为中心构建严密的排他的社会网络。一个人可以跟很多个阶梯都有关联，但通常跟位阶更高的阶梯有最紧密的联系。（像G4阶层和E4阶层这样的）过渡阶层则比较特殊，一个人如果在过渡阶层太久还不能跃升，就会被这个阶梯拒之门外。在绝大多数情况下，一个人只与一种阶梯保持最紧密的联系。不同阶梯的价值观有很大冲突，一个人不可能不做出选择。
I’ve argued that the ladders connect at a two-rung difference, with L2 ~ G4, L1 ~ G3, G2 ~ E4, and G1 ~ E3. These are “social equivalencies” that don’t involve a change in social status, so they’re the easiest to transitions to make (in both directions). They represent a transfer from one form of capital to another. A skilled laborer (L2) who begins taking night courses (G4) is using time to get an education rather than more money. Likewise, one who moves from the high gentry (G2) to a 90-hour-per-week job in private wealth management (E4) is applying her refined intellectual skills and knowledge to serving the rich, in the hope of making the connections to become one of them.
本文认为，相邻的两个阶梯，大概有两个阶层的高度差，也就是说L2阶层与G4阶层差不多等高、L1阶层与G3阶层差不多等高、G2阶层与E4阶层差不多等高、G1阶层与E3阶层差不多等高。这些“两两相应”的阶层在社会地位上相差无几，最容易实现双向流动。这样的流动是他们从现有的“生产要素”向另一种“生产要素”的转移。（L2阶层的）熟练工人去上夜校（流动到G4阶层），是拿出劳动时间去接受教育，而不是去赚更多的钱。同样，一个从上流士绅（G2阶层）流动的私人财富管理公司（E4阶层），开始每周工作90小时，是运用她精湛的知识技能去服务权贵，积累社会关系，希望有朝一日成为权贵阶梯的一员。
That said, these ladders often come into conflict. The most relevant one to most of my readers will be the conflict between the Gentry and the Elite. The Gentry tends to be left-libertarian and values creativity, individual autonomy, and free expression. The Elite tends toward center-right authoritarianism and corporate conformity, and it views creativity as dangerous (except when applied to hiding financial risks or justifying illegal wars). The Gentry believes that it is the deserving elite and the face of the future, and that it can use culture to engineer a future in which its values are elite; while the upper tier of the Elite finds the Gentry pretentious, repugnant, self-indulgent, and subversive. The relationship between the Gentry and Elite is incredibly contentious. It’s a cosmic, ubiquitous war between the past and the future.
尽管如此，阶梯与阶梯之间也会经常发生冲突。对我的大多数读者来说，最息息相关的是权贵阶梯和士绅阶梯之间的冲突。士绅阶梯通常是左翼自由主义者，重视创新、自主和自由表达。权贵阶梯则通常是中右翼专制主义者，推崇集体服从一致，认为创新很危险（除非用于隐瞒金融风险或为非法战争辩护）。士绅阶梯认为自己是当之无愧的精英，代表着未来，可以利用文化来设计和创造未来，让自己的价值观成为精英的价值观；而上层权贵则认为士绅阶梯自命不凡、高高在上、自我放纵、倒反天罡。士绅阶梯与权贵阶梯之间的关系非常紧张。他们之间的全面战争贯穿过去与未来，无时无刻无处不在。
Between the Gentry and Labor, there is an attitude of distrust. The Elite has been running a divide-and-conquer strategy between these two categories for decades. This works because the Elite understands (and can ape) the culture of the Gentry, but has something in common with Labor that sets the categories apart from the Gentry: a conception of work as a theater for masculine dominance. This is something that the Elite and Labor both believe in– the visceral strength and importance of the alpha-male in high-stakes gambling settings such as most modern work– but that the Gentry would rather deny. Gender is a major part of the Elite’s strategy in turning Labor against the Gentry: make the Gentry look effeminate. That’s why “feminist” is practically a racial slur, despite the world desperately needing attention to women’s political equality, health and well-being (that is, feminism).
士绅阶梯与劳工阶梯不信任彼此。几十年来，权贵阶梯一直对士绅阶梯与劳工阶梯采取分而治之的策略。这种做法之所以奏效，是因为权贵阶梯既看得懂（并能够模仿）士绅阶梯的文化，又与劳工阶梯也有一些共通之处：两者都认为工作是由男性主导的场域。权贵阶梯和劳工阶梯都坚信，男性头领的力量在高风险、高收益的搏杀环境中至关重要，包括现代的工作场里。但士绅阶梯却不愿意承认这一点。权贵阶梯让劳工阶梯和士绅阶梯内斗的主要策略之一就是性别议题，因为这个议题会让士绅阶梯显得很娘炮。这也就导致了，哪怕这个世界迫切需要关注女性的政治平等、健康和福祉（也就是女权主义），“女权主义者”这个词依然被看做带有侮辱性的贬义词，
The Elite also uses the Underclass in a different process: the Elite wants Labor think the Gentry intends to conspire with the Underclass to dismantle Labor values and elevate these “obviously undeserving” people to, at least, the status of Labor if not promoted above them. They exploit fear in Labor. One might invoke racism and the “Southern strategy” in politics as an example of this, but the racial part is incidental. The Elite don’t care whether it’s blacks or Latinos or “illegals” or red-haired people or homosexuals (most of whom are not part of the Underclass) that are being used to frighten Labor into opposing and disliking the Gentry; they just know that the device works and that it has pretty much always worked.
在劳工阶梯和士绅阶梯的内斗中，权贵阶梯还会利用社会底层：让劳工阶梯认为，士绅阶梯在与社会底层联手，一边瓦解劳工阶梯的价值观，一边让“明显不配”的社会底层晋升至劳工阶梯，甚至让他们跻身劳工阶梯之上。他们借此激发利用劳工阶梯的恐惧心理。有人可能会说，美国政治中的种族主义和“南方战略”就是典型的例子，但种族主义问题其实只是副作用。只要能让劳工阶梯反对和反抗士绅阶梯，权贵阶梯才不关心他们的恐惧心理究竟来自于黑人、拉美裔、“非法移民”、北欧红发人还是同性恋者（这些人大多数并不属于社会底层）；对于权贵阶梯来说，只在乎手段是不是有效，到目前而言确实一直都很有效。
The relationship between the Gentry and Elite is one of open rivalry, and that between the Gentry and Labor is one of distrust. What about Labor and the Elite? That one is not symmetric. The Elite exploit and despise Labor as a class comprised mostly of “useful idiots”. How does Labor see the Elite? They don’t. The Elite has managed to convince Labor that the Gentry (who are open about their cultural elitism, while the Elite hides its social and economic elitism) is the actual “liberal elite” responsible for Labor’s misery over the past 30 years. In effect, the Elite has constructed an “infinity pool” where the Elite appears to be a hyper-successful extension of Labor, lumping these two disparate ladders into an “us” and placing the Gentry and Underclass into “them”.
士绅阶梯和权贵阶梯之间的关系是明确的竞争和敌对，而士绅阶梯和劳工阶梯之间的关系则是互不信任。那劳工阶梯和权贵阶梯之间呢？他们之间的关系就不具备系统性了。权贵阶梯剥削并鄙视劳工阶梯，认为他们不过是由“有用的傻瓜”组成的阶级。劳工阶梯如何看待权贵阶梯呢？他们看不到。权贵阶梯已经设法让劳工阶梯相信，（公开宣扬文化精英主义的）士绅阶梯就是真正的自由主义权贵，劳工阶梯在过去三十多年所承受的苦难都是士绅阶梯造成的。（而权贵阶梯对于自己的社会和经济精英主义从来闭口不谈。）权贵阶梯就像是建造了一个“无边泳池”，表面上，权贵阶梯就像是取得了超凡成就的劳工阶梯一样，两个完全不同的阶梯融为一体成了“自己人”，而士绅阶梯和社会底层成了“外人”。
Despite its upper ranks being filled by people who are effectively thugs, the Elite isn’t entirely evil. By population, most of them are merely E3 and E4 stewards with minimal decision-making power, and a lot of those come from (and return to) the Gentry and maintain those values. On the other hand, Elite values tend to be undesirable, because at that structure’s pinnacle are the E1 crime bosses. There are good people within the Elite, even though the Elite itself is not good.
尽管权贵阶梯的上流阶层都非常野蛮，但也并非全都是邪恶的人。按人口分布来看，主要的权贵阶梯份子都在E3阶层和E4阶层，他们也是打工的，决策权极小，其中很多人来自（甚至还会回归）士绅阶梯，还保持着士绅阶梯的价值观。反观权贵阶梯的价值观往往令人不齿，因为权贵阶梯的巅峰是E1阶层，是毒枭、霸主。即使在权贵阶梯中有好人，权贵阶梯本身也不是什么正义化身。
For virtue, the Gentry does better. I don’t want to fall into the American fallacy of conflating “middle class” with virtue, and there are some awful and good people in all social classes, but I think that the Gentry is a more inclusive and reflective elite– one of ideas and values, not based on exclusivity.
品德方面，士绅阶梯更胜一筹。我不想陷进把美国“中产阶级”等同于善良美好的谬论。所有社会阶级中都有好人和坏人，但我认为士绅阶梯是更具包容性和反思性的精英群体，他们是基于思想和价值观的精英，而不是排他的精英。
One Gentry stronghold for a long time has been high technology, a meritocracy where skill, know-how, and drive enabled a person to rise to technical leadership of increasing scope and eventually business leadership and entrepreneurship. This created the engineering culture of Hewlett-Packard (before Fiorina) and the “Don’t Be Evil” mantra of Google. This is Gentry culture asserting itself. Be ethical, seek positive-sum outcomes, and win by being great rather than by harming, robbing, or intimidating others. It’s not how business is practiced in most of the world– zero-sum thuggery is a lot more common– but it’s how great businesses are made. This weird world in which self-made success was regarded higher than entrenchment, symbolized in Silicon Valley, enabled people from the Gentry to become very rich and Gentry ideas to establish lasting success in business.
长期以来，高科技行业一直是士绅阶梯的一个主要阵地，在这个领域，凭借技能、知识和冲劲，一个人可以逐步晋升为技术领导，最终成为企业领导和企业家。在这个领域，诞生了惠普（在菲奥莉娜之前）的工程文化和谷歌的“不作恶”原则。这就是士绅文化的体现。要讲道德，追求双赢、多赢，追求正义和公平，通过做道义之事赢得胜利，而不是去伤害、抢劫或恐吓。世界上大多数企业并不是这么运作的——更为常见的是零和游戏、威慑恐吓——但这是打造伟大企业的方式。如今，创业成功大受追捧，尤以硅谷为代表。这让士绅阶梯的人创业致富，并让他们的创意转化为商业里成功的案例。
What has made America great, especially from 1933 until now, has been the self-assertion of the Gentry following the defeat of the Elite. The first half of the American Era (1933 to 1973) utterly emasculated the Elite. Their rapacious greed and world-fucking parasitism was repaid with 90-percent tax rates, and they told to consider themselves lucky that it wasn’t full-on socialism (or a violent revolution in which they all died, Paris-1793-style). The so-called “WASP culture” of the E2 class derives many of its norms from the paranoia of that period (when the global elite was very small, and they were the “robber baron” elite). For example, the demand that a house not be visible from the road comes from a time in which that was physically dangerous. This four-decade curtailment of the American Elite, and the more resounding destruction of the European ones, was one of the best things that ever happened to the world. It made the golden age of Silicon Valley possible.
美国之所以伟大，尤其是从1933年至今，是因为权贵阶梯受挫败后，士绅阶梯奋发图强自我成就。美国黄金时代的前半段（1933年至1973年）彻底削弱了权贵阶梯的权力。他们贪婪无度，对全世界寄生吸血，攫取超高收入，在这一时期被课以90%的超高税率。社会给他们的讯息是，他们应该为美国没有全面实行社会主义（或者1793年巴黎那场暴力革命）而感到幸运（否则他们可能连命都会丢掉）。E2阶层的“WASP文化”中，有许多生活习惯都源于这一时期的恐惧（当时世界权贵阶层还非常少，国内权贵就是无可辩驳的“强盗霸主”权贵）。例如，他们就是从那个时候开始，喜欢住在远离道路的房子里，因为那时候，住临街的房子很危险。美国权贵阶级在那四十年不断萎缩，欧洲权贵阶级同时期衰落得更严重，但这却是最有利于全球百姓的好事之一。它为硅谷的黄金时代做了铺垫。
There are a lot of reasons why this “golden age” of a disempowered Elite was able to occur, but World War II was the biggest of all of them. Future historians will probably regard the two World Wars as one monstrous conflict, with a period of crippling, worldwide economic depression between them. Few disagree with the claim, for example, that the resolution of the First World War led inexorably to the evils of totalitarianism and the Second of these wars. This giant and largely senseless conflict’s causes seem complex– historians are still debating World War I’s inception– but the short version is that the world’s Elites did that. There was a 30-year period of war, famine, poverty, racial pogroms, and misery that existed largely because a network of high-level obligations and horrendous ideas (especially the racism used to justify colonialism, which benefitted the rich of these societies enormously, but sent the poor to die in unjust wars, contract awful diseases for which they had no immunity, and commit atrocities) set the conditions up. After about a hundred million deaths and thirty tears of war, societies finally decided, “No More”. They dismantled their Elites vigorously, North American and European nations included. This became the “golden age” of the educated Gentry. In the U.S. (for which the 1950s were a decade of prosperity; in Europe, it was a period of rebuilding and not very prosperous) it was also the “golden age of the middle class”.
权贵失势的“黄金时代”之所以能够出现，有诸多原因，其中最主要的原因是二战。回望过去，历史学家可能会将两次世界大战视为造成人间炼狱的武力冲突，并且两次世界大战之间还有一段全球性经济大萧条的垃圾时间。例如，几乎所有人都认为，第一次世界大战的解决方式必然导致极权主义的崛起和第二次世界大战的爆发。一战的浩劫毫无意义，起因也很复杂——历史学家至今仍在争论第一次世界大战的起因——但简而言之，其背后的始作俑者就是权贵阶级。战争、饥荒、贫困、种族屠杀和灾难持续了30年，主要因为上层阶级的一系列“箭在弦上不得不发”和可怕的意识形态创造了条件（尤其是他们用来为殖民主义辩护的种族主义，这种意识形态让权贵赚得盆满钵满，却让穷人死于师出无名的战争，感染可怕的疾病，遭受暴行）。在长达30年的战争中，有一亿人死于非命，各国终于下定决心“不能再这样下去了”。他们强力瓦解了各自的权贵阶级，包括北美和欧洲各国。这也造就了士绅阶级的“黄金时代”。在美国，20世纪50年代被称为“中产阶级的黄金时代”，这一时期美国经济繁荣。而在欧洲，这个时期则是战后重建阶段，经济并不十分繁荣。
However, the Elite has brought itself back to life. This Gilded Age isn’t as bad as the last one, but it’s heading that way. It started in the late 1970s when the U.S. fell in love again with elitism: Studio 54, cocaine– a drug that captures the personality of that cultural change well, because its effect is to flood the brain with dopamine, causing extreme arrogance– and “trickle-down economics”.
然而，权贵阶级现在已经重新崛起。这个“镀金时代”虽然不如上一个权贵主导的时代那么糟糕，但正朝着那个方向发展。权贵主导的新时代始于20世纪70年代末，当时美国再次走上精英主义：Studio 54夜总会、可卡因（这种毒品很好地反映了当时的文化变革特征，它能让大脑充满多巴胺，让人极度傲慢）以及“涓滴经济学”。
Assessing the present state of conflict requires attention to what each party wants. What does the Gentry want? The Gentry has a strange, love-hate relationship with capitalism. Corporations are detested (even more than they deserve) by this class and most people in the Gentry want the U.S. to look more like Europe: universal healthcare, decent vacation allotments, and cheap, ecologically sound high-speed trains. This might give the impression of a socialist bent, and that impression’s not wrong. Yet their favorite places are New York (the center of capitalism) and Silicon Valley (also fiercely capitalistic). Although left-leaning, the Gentry are strong champions for non-corporate capitalism. There is no contradiction here. European social democracies have also managed to create hybrid systems that combine the safety and infrastructure of socialism with the innovation and individual liberty of capitalism: the best of both worlds.
要分析阶级冲突的现状，需要了解各个阶级的诉求。士绅阶级的诉求是什么？士绅阶级对资本主义又爱又恨，感情十分复杂。士绅阶级对大公司怀有强烈的憎恨（有时候大公司甚至略显无辜）。大多数士绅阶级希望美国能更像欧洲：设立全民医疗保健、足够的假期、廉价环保的高铁。这可能让人觉得很像社会主义，的确如此。然而，士绅阶级最喜欢的地方是纽约（资本主义的中心）和硅谷（资本主义的根据地）。尽管士绅阶级属于左翼，但他们坚定支持非公司资本主义（non-corporate capitalism）。这并不矛盾。欧洲的社会民主国家成功地建立了混合制度，将社会主义的社保和基础设施与资本主义的创新和个人自由结合起来，实现了两全其美。
For a contrast, what the Elite has been pushing for is the worst of both worlds, at least for average people. The truth of corporate “capitalism” is that it provides the best of both systems (socialism and capitalism) for the Elite and the worst of both for everyone else. It’s a welfare state in which only very well-connected people are citizens, it favors command economies (which are what most corporations are, internally) and it stifles the positive-sum innovation that is capitalism’s saving grace. The upper tier of society wants social stability for themselves (to stay in and keep others out) but they favor extreme economic variability (also known as “inequality”) because it gives them more opportunities to exploit their social status for economic gain (read: private-sector corruption).
与之相反，权贵阶级一直以来推行的，则是社会主义最阴暗的一面和资本主义最恶毒的一面，对普通人来说这个组合是雪上加霜。本质上，企业“资本主义”（corporate capitalism）为权贵阶级提供了两种制度（社会主义和资本主义）的好处，而让其他人承担了两种制度的代价。它让一个国家只眷顾背景深厚的特权阶级，偏爱指令性经济模式（比如大公司内部便是如此），扼杀正和创新。而正和创新恰恰是资本主义的救命稻草。社会上层希望社会保持稳定（即维持自己的现有阶层，不让其他人进入），但他们偏爱极端的经济变异性（即“不平等”和“波动性”），因为这让他们有更多机会利用自己的优势社会地位谋取经济利益（即私营部门的腐败）。
Air travel in the contemporary U.S. is an illustrative example of this “worst of both worlds” scenario: the pricing is erratic, unreasonable, and even a bit mean-spirited, which shows the volatility of capitalism, while the low quality of service and the abysmal morale of the industry feel like direct transplants from the Soviet Union.
当代美国航空业就是这种“两种制度恶果相加”的典型例子：定价不稳定、不合理，甚至有些刻薄，显示了资本主义的变异性；而服务质量低下和行业士气低落则像是从苏联直接移植过来的。
A major battle is coming, with all three of these categories (Labor, Gentry, and Elite) involved. The Gentry and the Elite are at fundamental opposites on the type of society they want to see and, for decades, the Elite has been winning, but their victories are becoming harder to win as technology opens up the world. Labor might seem like a nonparticipant in the ideological battles, but they comprise most of the casualties, and they’ve seen shells land in their backyard (especially if they live in Detroit). Not only are they losing their jobs and social status, but their communities have been demolished.
一场巨大的冲突即将爆发，将涉及所有阶梯——劳工阶梯、士绅阶梯和权贵阶梯。士绅阶梯和权贵阶梯对理想社会的设想存在根本对立。几十年来，权贵阶梯一直占上风，但随着科技打开了世界的大门，他们要维持优势变得越来越难。在意识形态斗争中，劳工阶梯看似没有直接参与，但他们却是主要的受害者。而且，他们已经在承受这场斗争的狂轰滥炸，尤其是底特律的工人。他们不仅失去了工作和社会地位，长期居住的社区也被摧毁了。
Something else is happening, which is relevant both in a macro historical sense and to the U.S. in 2012. One way to divide human history is into three eras: pre-Malthusian, Trans-Malthusian, and post-Malthusian. I refer, of course, to the prediction of Thomas Malthus, early in the Industrial Revolution, that population growth in contemporary societies would lead to a catastrophe because population grew exponentially, while economic growth was linear. He was wrong. Economic growth has always been exponential, but for most of human history it has had a very slow (under 1% per year) exponential curve– slower than population growth, and slow enough to look linear. His mathematical model was wrong, but his conclusion– that population grows until it is checked (i.e. people die) by disease, famine, and war– was true in nature and of almost every human society from the dawn of time to about 1800. He was wrong that it would afflict England and the richer European countries in the mid-19th century– because the Industrial Revolution accelerated economic growth enough to prevent a global Malthusian crunch. On the other hand, there were local Malthusian catastrophes. Ireland endured severe poverty and oppression, colonialism was deeply horrible and did, in fact, represent many of the vices Malthus warned about.
还有一些事情正在发生变好，既与宏观历史有关，也与2012年的美国有关。我们可以把人类历史划分为三个时代：前马尔萨斯时代、跨马尔萨斯时代和后马尔萨斯时代。这里的马尔萨斯是指托马斯·马尔萨斯（Thomas Malthus）在工业革命早期（18世纪末）提出的一种人口理论，主要论点是人口增长的速度会超过食物供应的增长，从而导致资源短缺和社会危机，因为人口呈指数增长，而经济增长是线性的。他错了。经济增长一直是呈指数增长的，但在人类历史的大部分时间里，经济增长的指数曲线非常缓慢（每年低于1%）——比人口增长还要慢，慢到看起来像是线性的。他的数学模型是错的，但他得出的结论在自然界以及从远古到大约1800年是正确的，即人口会持续增长，除非被瘟疫、饥荒和战争遏制。他之所以错，是因为工业革命加速了经济增长，从而有效地避免了全球范围内的马尔萨斯危机。另一方面，有一些地区确实出现了类似马尔萨斯灾难的情况。爱尔兰承受了严重的贫困和压迫，殖民主义体现了马尔萨斯预言的许多特征，造成了可怕的灾难。
The world was pre-Malthusian when societies were doomed to grow faster in population than in their ability to support it. This led, over the millennia, to certain assumptions about society that can be categorized as “zero-sum”. For one tribe to take care of its young, another tribe must lose wealth or be destroyed. For English to be rich, Irish must starve. For Southern whites to live well, blacks must be slaves. For capital to be profitable, labor must be exploited. If Catholic Spain has one colony, Protestant England must have more. For the German people to have “lebensraum”, Central European countries must be invaded and their inhabitants killed. “Medieval” horrors were an artifact of the Malthusian reality of that time, but such atrocities continued even as the long-standing Malthusian inequality (population growth being greater than economic growth) reversed itself.
在前马尔萨斯时代，人口增长速度注定会超过社会的承受能力。千百年来，这种情况导致我们认为整个人类社会是“零和”博弈。一个部落要为自己的孩子谋取福利，另一个部落就必须丧失财富或遭受灭顶之灾。英国要富裕，爱尔兰就必须忍受饥饿。南方白人要过优越的生活，黑人就必须成为奴隶。资本为了实现盈利，劳工就必须受到剥削。如果天主教西班牙拥有一块殖民地，那么新教英格兰就必须拥有更多殖民地。德国人要有“生存空间”，就必须入侵中欧国家并屠杀那里的居民。中世纪的黑暗压迫是那个时代的马尔萨斯灾难，但即使在长期的马尔萨斯不平等（人口增长超过经济增长）发生逆转后，类似的黑暗压迫也仍在继续。
We are now in a trans-Malthusian state, and have been for about two hundred years. Global economic growth is now over 4% per year, which is the fastest it has ever been, and there’s no sign of it slowing down. The world has a lot of problems, and there are pockets of severe decay, corruption, and poverty; but on the whole, it’s becoming a better place, and at an accelerating (hyper-exponential) rate. The world is no longer intrinsically Malthusian, but pre-Malthusian attitudes still dominate, especially at the pinnacles of our most successful societies. This shouldn’t be shocking, because the very traits (especially, low empathy and greed) that would be required to succeed in a zero-sum world are still strong in our upper classes. This legacy won’t go away overnight. The people haven’t changed very much. Pre-Malthusian fearmongering is also very effective on less intelligent people, who haven’t figured out that the world has changed in the past two hundred years. They still believe in the zero-sum world wherein, if “illegal” immigrants “take all the jobs”, middle-class white people will starve.
我们目前处于跨马尔萨斯时期，这种状态已经持续了大约200年。目前，全球经济年增长率超过4%，是有史以来最快的增长速度，且没有放缓的迹象。现在，世界依然面临许多问题，有一些地方存在严重的腐败和贫困；但总体而言，世界正在以加速（超指数）的速度变得越来越好。从根本上说，现在的世界不再是马尔萨斯式的世界，但前马尔萨斯式的观念仍占主导地位，尤其是在最成功的社会顶层。这并不意外，因为在零和博弈的世界中取得成功所需的那些特质（尤其是低同情心和贪婪），在美国的上层社会中依然非常普遍。这种传承不会在一夜之间消失。那些人的本质并没有发生显著变化。前马尔萨斯式的恐惧宣传对不那么开化的人还是很有效，因为他们尚未意识到世界在过去两百年间已经发生了翻天覆地的变化。他们仍然笃信零和世界观，比如“非法”移民“抢走了所有工作”，中产阶级白人就注定会挨饿。
The trans-Malthusian state is, I believe, intrinsically more volatile than a pre-Malthusian one. Technology is causing the job market to change faster, but this paradoxically makes individual spells of unemployment longer. Another thing is that we’re seeing something that pre-Malthusian economies didn’t have to worry about: economic depressions. This is not to romanticize pre-Malthusian life or societies. They would experience famines, wars, and disease epidemics that would kill far more people than any economic depression, but those had natural or historical causes that were not intrinsic and desirable. We’ve been able to eliminate most of these evils from life without losing anything in the process. These depressions, in my view, come from economic progress itself (and moreover, our inability to manage growth in a way that distributes prosperity, rather than displacing people). The first quarter of the 20th century saw unprecedented advancement in food production– a good thing, undeniably– which caused agricultural commodities to drop in price. This caused small farmers (who could not partake in these advances to the same extent) to fall into poverty. Without the small farmers, towns supported by them weren’t doing well either. Poverty isn’t a “moral medicine” that clears out the bad in society. It doesn’t make people better or harder working. It ruins people. It’s a cancer. It spreads. And it did. Rural poverty was severe in the United States by 1925, before the Depression officially began. Urban sophisticates and elites were OK in 1925, hence this era is remembered as being prosperous. In 1933? Not so much. The cancer had grown. Throughout the 1930s, the rich were terrified of an American communist revolution.
我认为，与前马尔萨斯时代相比，跨马尔萨斯时代更加不稳定。技术使就业市场更快变化，但矛盾的是，对于个人而言，失业时间更长了。另一个问题是，我们还要面对前马尔萨斯时代不必担心的问题：经济萧条。这并不是要将前马尔萨斯时代的生活或社会浪漫化。那个时代有也有饥荒、战争和流行病，而且这些灾难导致的死亡人数远远超过经济萧条。然而，这些灾难的原因都是自然原因或历史原因，并非内生的。我们已经消除了引发这些灾难的大部分起因，而且过程并不痛苦。在我看来，经济萧条源于经济进步本身（还有就是，我们无法合理地分配经济增长成果，无法使经济进步惠及广大群体）。在20世纪前25年，粮食生产取得了前所未有的进步——不可否认，这是一个积极的现象——这导致农产品价格下降。小农因此陷入贫困，进步带来的好处根本没办法让他们获益。失去了小农的支持，依赖小农的城镇也无法维持良好生计。贫穷并不是消除社会渣滓的“道德良药”。它不会使人变得更好或更加努力工作。相反，它会让人沉沦。贫穷是社会的癌症。它会传播扩散。毫不夸张。在大萧条正式开始之前，1925年，美国农村的贫困状况已经非常严重。1925年，城市中的先进分子和权贵阶层的生活状况相对较好，因此在人们的记忆中，这一时期是繁荣的时代。但是到了1933年呢？情况就变差了。因为癌症已经扩散。在整个20世纪30年代，富人全都担心美国会爆发共产主义革命。
We don’t want another Great Depression, and what’s scary in 2012 is that it seems like what happened to agricultural products in the 1920s is now happening to almost all human labor. We’re outsourcing, automating, and “streamlining”, and all of these changes are fundamentally good, but if we don’t take steps to prevent the collapse of the middle class, we could lose our country. This will almost certainly require innovations that the right wing will decry as “socialism”, but it will also involve techniques (such as crowd-funding and microloans for small businesses) that are far more capitalistic than anything the corporates have come up with.
我们可不希望再次经历大萧条。最令人担忧的是，上世纪20年代发生在农产品市场上的现象，2012年似乎正在几乎所有劳动力市场上重演。我们把产业外包、产线自动化、流程“精简”，从根本上来说这些变化都是有益的。可是，如果我们不采取措施，中产阶级就必然萎缩崩塌，国将不国。我们需要采取的措施，肯定会被右翼斥为“社会主义”，但也有一些措施（如针对小企业的众筹和小额贷款）非常符合资本主义，最起码比大企业所提供的措施更符合资本主义。
We are trans– (not post-) Malthusian because we live in a world where scarcity is still in force (although often artificial) and zero-sum mentalities dominate (even though they’re inappropriate to a technological world). If Mexican immigrants “take the jobs”, formerly middle-class white people will be without healthcare. What’s required is to step away from the zero-sum attitude (expressed often in racism) and recognize that no one of any ethnicity, jobless or employed, should be without healthcare. Ever. Technology is great at helping us generate more resources and make more with what we have, and we have to accept that it will “unemploy” people on a regular basis, but the bounty should be distributed fairly, and not hogged by the fortunate while those it renders transiently jobless are allowed to fall into poverty. “Collateral damage” is not acceptable and, if the 1920s and ’30s are illustrative, it can’t be contained. The damage will spread.
我们生活的时代，是跨马尔萨斯时代，而不是后马尔萨斯时代，因为我们所处的世界依然存在稀缺性（尽管这种稀缺性往往是人为造成的），零和思维依然占据主导地位（尽管在科技发达的世界中，这种思维已经过时了）。如果墨西哥移民“抢走了工作”，以前的白人中产阶级就会失去医疗保健。我们要摆脱零和思维（通常表现为种族主义），接纳所有人都应该享受医疗保障，不管是什么种族，也无论是否有工作。不设前提。技术可以帮助我们创造更多的资源，并利用现有资源创造更多的财富。我们也必须接受技术会导致人频繁“失业”的事实，但这些新创造的财富应当得到公平分配，而不是被少数幸运儿垄断，而那些因技术暂时失业的人却陷入贫困。“附带损害”是不可接受的。通过上世纪二三十年代的情况也能看得出，这种损害一定会引起连锁反应。一定会蔓延。
What does this have to do with the ladders and their conflict? Labor is a trans-Malthusian social category because it lives in a world that values fair play (a positive-sum, post-Malthusian value) but that is constrained by artificial scarcity. The Elite is pre-Malthusian; they are obsessed with the zero-sum game of social status and the need to keep themselves elevated and others out. The Gentry, although not without its faults, is properly post-Malthusian. Their values (political liberalism, individual freedom, enough socialism to ensure a just society, positive-sum outlook, and a positive view of technology) represent what it will take to evolve toward a post-Malthusian state.
这与社会阶梯及阶梯冲突有什么关系？劳工阶梯是跨马尔萨斯的社会阶级，因为它重视公平竞争（这是正和博弈的后马尔萨斯价值观），但现在的世界却充斥着人为制造的稀缺。权贵阶梯是前马尔萨斯的社会阶级；他们沉迷于社会地位的零和游戏，需要让自己高高在上，把别人踩在脚下。士绅阶梯虽然存在一些缺点，但却是后马尔萨斯的社会阶级。他们的价值观（政治自由主义、个人自由、能确保社会公正的社会主义、正和博弈观以及对技术的积极看法）代表了发展建设后马尔萨斯国家的必要条件。
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